Credit spreads are large, volatile and countercyclical, and recent empirical work suggests that risk premia, not expected credit losses, are responsible for these features. Building on the idea that corporate debt, while safe in ordinary recessions, is exposed to economic depressions, this paper embeds a trade-o¤ theory of capital structure into a real business cycle model with a small, exogenously time-varying risk of economic disaster. The model replicates the level, volatility and cyclicality of credit spreads, and variation in the corporate bond risk premium ampli…es macroeconomic ‡uctua-tions in investment, employment and GDP.
For instance, an investment grade (BAA) bond defaults with probability around 0.4% per year, and the recovery upon default is around 50%, hence expected losses are about 20 basis points, but the BAA-AAA spread averages close to 100bps, or …ve times more. 2 Hence, corporate bonds sell at a discount relative to expected cash ‡ows, i.e. they present the investor with an average excess return, or corporate bond risk premium, similar conceptually to the well-known equity risk premium. Second, this corporate bond premium appears to account for the bulk of the movements in credit spreads, and for the movements correlated with investment. 3 The contribution of this paper is to propose a tractable, quantitative, macroeconomic framework that reproduces these key features of credit spreads, and to study its implications for business cycles. By their very nature, corporate bonds are safe in normal times, and su¤er only from limited default during ordinary recessions, but are exposed to the risk of a very large downturn such as the Great Depression.
This suggests that the corporate bond risk premium re ‡ects compensation for bearing "tail risk", i.e. low probability events with disastrous consequences. Building on this idea, I embed a simple model of capital structure, where the choice of defaultable debt is driven by taxes and bankruptcy costs, into a real business cycle (RBC) model, and incorporate a small risk of an economic "disaster", following the work of Rietz (1988) , Barro (2006) , Gabaix (2012) , and Gourio (2012) . The risk of disaster captures the possibility of a very large recession such as the Great Depression, and is assumed to vary exogenously over time.
the standard Euler equation is adjusted to re ‡ect that investment is …nanced using both debt and equity, and the user cost of capital hence takes into account expected discounted bankruptcy costs as well as the tax advantage of debt. Second, an additional equation determines the endogenous leverage choice, by equating the marginal expected discounted (tax) bene…ts and (bankruptcy) costs of debt. The model remains highly tractable and intuitive, which allows a simple quantitative evaluation of the role of defaultable debt on quantities and prices. In particular, the model nests the standard real business cycle model in the limiting case of an all-equity …nanced …rm.
The paper generates four central results. First, as in Gourio (2012) , an exogenous increase in the probability of disaster leads to a recession driven by a reduction of investment and employment:
uncertainty leads agents to save less in risky capital. Second, credit spreads are large, volatile and countercyclical, consistent with the data outlined above. Third, and also consistent with the data, the level, volatility and countercyclicality in credit spreads are driven by the risk premium rather than by expected credit losses. To understand how the model replicates these features of the data, note that when the probability of economic disaster exogenously increases, there are two o¤setting e¤ects on the endogenous probability of default. First, holding constant leverage, a higher probability of disaster of course leads to a higher probability of default since the likelihood of bad outcome increases. However, higher disaster risk leads investors to cut back on leverage, which reduces the probability of default.
Overall, the probability of default is roughly uncorrelated with investment. However, defaults are now expected to be more systematic, i.e. more likely to be triggered by a bad aggregate shock rather than a bad idiosyncratic shock; as a result expected discounted bankruptcy costs rise. This makes corporate bonds less attractive as an investment for households and increases the corporate bond risk premium and hence credit spreads, without a signi…cant change in actual default probability.
The fourth result is that debt …nancing ampli…es substantially -by a factor of about three -the response of the economy to an increase in the disaster probability. The higher corporate bond risk premium leads …rms to use less debt and to substitute for equity -but debt is cheaper because of its tax advantage. As a result, the user cost of capital goes up by more with debt …nancing. Consistent with the extant literature (e.g. Cordoba and Ripoll (2004) , Khan and Thomas (2011) , Kocherlakota (2000) ), this ampli…cation e¤ect does not arise if the economy is subjected to TFP shocks.
The model has several implications. First, eliminating the deductibility of interest expenses from taxable corporate income leads to a reduction in leverage and in macroeconomic volatility. Second, making debt payments contingent on disaster realizations (as has been recently suggested by several commentators) reduces volatility substantially, by eliminating the ampli…cation e¤ect of …nancial frictions.
The importance of potential "default waves" for corporate bonds has been noted before in the However, an alternative interpretation of the data is that the variation in credit spreads, in particular during the 2008 …nancial crisis, is driven by the balance sheets of …nancial institutions, such as insurance companies, which may be the "marginal investors"in these markets (Brunnermeier and Sannikov (2012) or Krishnamurthy and He (2012) ). Under this interpretation, the credit spread re ‡ects a time-varying intermediation (or liquidity) wedge rather than an aggregate risk premium. While more research is needed to disentangle the importance of each factor, the risk premium explanation is attractive a priori because corporate bonds are not exotic assets that have to be intermediated: any household can buy directly a low-cost, diversi…ed portfolio of corporate bonds through a mutual fund or an ETF. Moreover, the simultaneous appearance of large spreads (low prices) in many di¤erent markets is suggestive of an aggregate risk premium.
In contrast to most of the macroeconomic literature, which focuses on small entrepreneurial …rms which cannot raise equity easily and rely on bank or debt …nance, the model is designed to capture the richer margins that large US corporations use to fund their assets. In my model, …rms always pay dividends (unless they default), and no borrowing constraint binds. The relative attractiveness of debt and equity …nance varies over time, leading to variation in the user cost of capital. This theory is attractive because it escapes the standard critique that most …rms do pay dividends and are "thus"unconstrained. Nor does the model rely on a signi…cant heterogeneity between small, productive, constrained …rms on the one hand, and large, unproductive, unconstrained …rms on the other hand.
Organization of the paper
The rest of the introduction discusses the related literature. Section 1 sets up the model, and Section 2 discusses the solution method and parameter choices. Section 3 presents the results, and Section 4 considers some implications and extensions of the baseline model. Section 5 concludes. An online appendix provides additional results and details the numerical method.
Related literature
The paper is related to four di¤erent branches of literature. First, the paper builds on the large macroeconomic literature studying general equilibrium business cycle models with …nancing constraints, as exempli…ed by Bernanke, Gertler and Gilchrist (1999 Second, the paper relates to the vast …nance literature on credit risk models and the "credit spread 5 A signi…cant di¤erence is that Philippon works under the Modigliani and Miller theorem, whereas bankruptcy costs play a key role in my analysis.
puzzle" (e.g. Leland (1994) 6 Moreover, this literature has exogenous cash ‡ows, no investment, and is not set in general equilibrium, making it di¢ cult to evaluate the macroeconomic impact of …nancial frictions. On the other hand, these papers consider richer cash ‡ow dynamics and long-term debt.
Third, the paper draws from the recent literature on "disasters" or rare events (Rietz (1988) , Barro (2006) , Gabaix (2012) , Wachter (2012) ). In particular, the model is a direct, but signi…cant, extension of Gourio (2012) , who studied a frictionless real business cycle model with time-varying disaster risk.
Finally, the paper considers the real e¤ects of a particular shock to uncertainty -a change in the probability of disaster. The negative e¤ect of uncertainty on output has been studied by Bloom (2009 
Model
This section presents the …rm and household problems and de…nes the equilibrium.
Firms
I …rst give an overview of the structure of the …rm problem, then I describe the mathematical formulation.
Summary
There is a continuum of perfectly competitive …rms, which are all identical ex-ante and di¤er ex-post only in their realization of an idiosyncratic shock. For expositional simplicity, …rms are assumed to live only for two periods. (I discuss at the end of this section how to relax this.) At the end of period t, new …rms are born and purchase capital K w t+1 in a competitive market, for use in period t + 1. This investment is …nanced by issuing equity S t and debt B t+1 claims. In period t + 1, the aggregate shocks and the idiosyncratic shock are revealed, …rms decide on employment and production, and then sell back their capital to a new generation of …rms. Two cases arise at this point: (1) the …rm value V t+1 is greater than outstanding debt B t+1 : the debt is then repaid in full and the residual value goes to equityholders as dividends; or (2) the …rm value is less than outstanding debt: in this case the absolute priority rule applies: equityholders are "wiped out", and bondholders capture the …rm's value, net of some bankruptcy costs. In all cases, these …rms disappear after production in period t + 1 and new …rms are created, which will raise funds and invest in period t + 1; and operate in period t + 2:
Since …rms are ex-ante identical, they all make the same choices. Because both production and …nancing technologies exhibit constant return to scales, the size distribution of …rms is indeterminate, and has no e¤ect on aggregate outcomes.
Production
All …rms have the same productivity and operate the same constant returns to scale Cobb-Douglas production function using capital and labor:
where z t is aggregate total factor productivity (TFP), and K it ,N it and Y it are the individual …rm capital stock, employment and output. Both input and output markets are competitive and frictionless.
Productivity shocks
To model the possibility of large recessions, I assume that the aggregate TFP process in this economy is driven not only by the usual "small" normally distributed shocks standard in RBC theory, but also by rare large shocks, which I call "disasters". Formally, log z t+1 = log z t + + e e t+1 + x t+1 b z;t+1 ; where fe t+1 g is i:i Hence, a disaster realization a¤ects total factor productivity permanently by a level factor. The realization of disaster also simultaneously a¤ects the capital stock, as explained in the next paragraph.
The probability that a disaster occurs at time t + 1 is denoted p t = Pr(x t+1 = 1); and this probability itself follows a Markov chain with transition matrix Q:
Depreciation shocks
Firms purchase capital at time t; but the actual quantity of capital that they will have to operate at time t+1 is random, and is a¤ected both by realizations of aggregate disasters x t+1 as well as an idiosyncratic shock " it+1 . Speci…cally, if a …rm i purchases K w it+1 units of capital at time t (where w stands for wish), it actually has K it+1 = K w it+1 e xt+1b k;t+1 " it+1 to operate in period t + 1; and (1 )K it+1 units of capital to resell. The shock b k;t+1 is i:
The idiosyncratic shock " it+1 is i:i:d: across …rms and across time, and drawn from a cumulative distribution function H, with mean unity. The idiosyncratic shock's sole purpose is to generate a smooth distribution of …rm value, so that some …rms default and some don't. Hence, technically, there are …ve aggregate shocks fe t+1 ; x t+1 ; p t+1 ; b z;t+1 ; b k;t+1 g ; which are are assumed to be independent, conditional on p t : 7
Discussion of the assumptions regarding disasters
The quantitative relevance of rare events is demonstrated by Barro (2006) and Barro and Ursua (2008) .
These authors construct a long country panel dataset and identify numerous large negative macroeconomic shocks, which are usually caused by wars or economic depressions. In a standard neoclassical model there are two simple ways to model these macroeconomic disasters -as destruction of the capital stock, or as a reduction in total factor productivity.
TFP appears to play an important role during economic depressions (Kehoe and Prescott (2007) ).
While economists do not understand well the sources of ‡uctuations in total factor productivity, large and persistent declines in TFP may be linked to poor government policies, such as expropriation, con…scatory taxes, or trade policies. They may also be caused by disruptions in …nancial intermediation, if these lead to ine¢ cient capital allocation.
Capital destruction is clearly realistic for wars or natural disasters, but not for economic depressions.
A broader interpretation is that it is not the physical capital but the intangible capital (customer and employee value) that is destroyed during prolonged economic depressions. This "capital quality" shock interpretation is also used in recent work on …nancial frictions (e.g. Gertler and Karadi (2011)).
My formulation introduces both features simultaneously, because the two are needed to generate realistic implications, as explained in Section 4. At heart, the model mechanism requires two ingredients:
(1) that disasters are clearly "bad events", with low consumption and high marginal utility of consumption; (2) that the realized return on capital is low during disasters. These assumptions are certainly realistic. Introducing a large TFP shock is the simplest way to obtain (1) in a neoclassical model, and introducing a depreciation shock is the simplest way to obtain (2) . An alternative to depreciation shocks is to introduce steep adjustment costs and to rely only on large TFP shocks: lower TFP would lead to lower investment and a lower price of capital, generating endogenously a low return on capital during disasters. I do not pursue this strategy in the paper as it is di¢ cult to calibrate adjustment costs to generate this e¤ect while maintaining realistic business cycle dynamics.
For parsimony and tractability, these rare disasters are modeled here as instantaneous, permanent jumps; Gourio (2012) shows that the key results are largely una¤ected if disasters are modeled as smaller shocks that are persistent, and are followed by recoveries, provided that risk aversion is increased somewhat.
Capital structure choice
Capital structure is driven by expected default costs and the tax advantage of debt. Bondholders recover a fraction of the …rm value upon default, where 0 < < 1. On the other hand, a …rm which issues debt at a price q receives q; where > 1; i.e. for each dollar that the …rm raises in the bond market, the government gives a subsidy 1 dollar. For simplicity, I assume that the subsidy takes place at issuance. 8 An alternative interpretation of is that it is a reduced form for the various advantages that debt has over equity; for instance the corporate …nance literature emphasizes that debt disciplines managers, or that it is more e¢ cient when information is asymmetric between …rm insiders and outsiders (see Tirole (2005) , chapters 5 and 6).
The bond price q is determined at time of issuance, taking into account default risk, and hence depends on the …rm's choice of debt and capital as well as the economy's state variables. Equity issuance is assumed to be costless. This assumption is natural given that the largest source of equity is retained earnings. 9 When = = 1; the capital structure is indeterminate and the Modigliani-Miller theorem holds.
When = 1, the …rm …nances only through equity, since debt has no advantage. As a result, there is no default, and the model degenerates to the the RBC model with disaster risk studied in Gourio (2012). When = 1, or more generally 1, the …rm …nances only through debt, since default is not costly. I will hence assume < 1, a necessary assumption to generate an interior choice for the capital structure.
Employment, Output, Pro…ts, and Firm Value
To solve the optimal …nancing choice, we …rst need to determine the pro…ts and the …rm value. (The probability distribution of …rm value determines the likelihood of default and hence the lending terms the …rm can obtain ex-ante.) The labor choice is determined through static pro…t maximization, given the realized values of productivity, the capital stock, and the aggregate wage W t :
which leads to the labor demand
and the output supply
These equations can then be aggregated. De…ne aggregate capital, output and employment as
i.e. an aggregate production function exists, and it has exactly the same shape as the microeconomic production function. The law of motion for capital is obtained by summing over i the equation
Since all …rms are identical ex-ante, and they will make the same investment choice K
, and since " it+1 has mean unity, idiosyncratic shocks average out, leading to
Pro…ts equal
i.e. each …rm receives factor payments for its capital, proportionally to the (idiosyncratic) quantity of capital it has, and to the aggregate marginal product of capital
Yt+1
Kt+1 . The total …rm value at the end 9 It is easy to incorporate additional equity costs through a reduced form cost function, as in Gomes (2001).
8 of the period is the sum of pro…ts and the proceeds from the sale of undepreciated capital:
An alternative expression for …rm value can be obtained by de…ning the return on capital. Let R
Kt+1 ; this is the familiar expression for the unlevered physical return on capital, adjusted to re ‡ect the possibility of disasters and ensuing capital destruction. The individual return on capital is also a¤ected by the idiosyncratic shock " it+1 ; hence de…ne R
The …rm value is thus the quantity of capital invested multiplied by the idiosyncratic return on capital:
Investment and Financing Decisions
To …nd the optimal choice of investment and …nancing, we …rst need to …nd the likelihood of default, and the loss-upon-default, for any possible choice of investment and …nancing. This determines the price of corporate debt. Taking as given this bond price schedule, the …rm can then decide on optimal investment and …nancing.
The …rm defaults if its realized value V it+1 is too low to repay the debt due B t+1 . This occurs if the …rm's idiosyncratic shock " is less than a cuto¤ value, which itself depends on the state of the economy (i.e., on the aggregate state variables). Mathematically, default occurs at time t + 1 if and only if
If a disaster is realized (x t+1 = 1), the realized aggregate return on capital R K t+1 is lower, the default threshold " t+1 is higher, and more …rms default. (Note that " t+1 is closely related to leverage, de…ned as L t+1 = B t+1 =K w t+1 ; and which is decided at time t:) Given this default rule, the bond issue is priced ex-ante using the representative agent's stochastic discount factor M t+1 :
where I is an indicator function, the …rst term captures the non-default states, where the debt is repaid in full (the bond payo¤ is one), and the second term the default states, where bondholders seize the …rm value V it+1 and divide it among themselves, net of bankruptcy costs, captured by the recovery parameter < 1: The bond price can be written as:
Note that the threshold between default and non-default, " t+1 , depends on aggregate realizations, notably disasters, and so does the return on capital R K t+1 and the discount factor M t+1 : We can …nally set up the …rm decision problem. It chooses at time t how much to invest and how much debt and equity to issue, so as to maximize the expected discounted net equity value:
subject to the funding constraint:
and the de…nition of the equity value
; as well as the bond price (3). The objective function (4) takes into account the option of default for equityholders. Note that, given constant return to scale, this net equity value will equal zero in equilibrium, re ‡ecting free entry.
Substituting equation (5) into the objective (4) shows that this problem is equivalent to maximizing the following total …rm value expression:
where
. This …rm value is the sum of (i) expected discounted value of capital,
, and (ii) the tax savings of debt, net of (iii) expected discounted bankruptcy costs (recall that < 1 by assumption) and (iv) the investment cost K w t+1 . By contrast, in a frictionless model ( = = 1), the …rm would simply maximize
. While bankruptcy costs are borne by debt holders ex-post, expected bankruptcy costs are passed on into debt prices ex-ante, implying that equity holders actually bear the costs of default.
To solve this problem, we can simply take …rst order conditions with respect to K w t+1 and B t+1 , taking into account that " t+1 = B t+1 = R 
In a model without …nancial frictions, the standard Euler equation is
here, equation (6) is modi…ed to take into account the tax shield (the second term), which reduces the user cost of capital if there is no default, and expected discounted bankruptcy costs (the third term) which increase it if there is default. In the case = = 1, we obtain the standard equation, which corresponds to an unlevered …rm (i.e. t+1 = 1).
Note that …rms always have the possibility to rely solely on equity, i.e. set B t+1 = 0 and consequently never default (" t+1 = 0). This implies that …rms always have access to cheaper …nancing than in the frictionless (all-equity …nanced) model. As a result, the steady-state capital stock is always higher when > 1 than in the frictionless version. The model hence features "overaccumulation" of capital, in contrast to many …nancial friction models (e.g. Bernanke, Gertler and Gilchrist (1999)) where capital is lower than the …rst best.
The …rst order condition with respect to B t+1 yields
This equation determines the optimal …nancing choice between debt and equity. 10 The left-hand side is the marginal cost of debt: an additional dollar of debt will increase the likelihood of default, and the associated bankruptcy costs. The right-hand side is the marginal bene…t of debt, i.e. the higher tax shield in non-default states. Importantly, both the marginal cost and the marginal bene…t are discounted using the stochastic discount factor M t+1 . The importance of this risk-adjustment is consistent with the empirical work by Almeida and Philippon (2007) , who note that corporate defaults are more frequent in "bad times"and as a result the ex-ante marginal cost of debt is higher than a risk-neutral calculation would suggest. This risk-adjustment will play a substantial role in the analysis below: for a given debt level, an increase in the probability of disaster increases expected discounted default costs, not because defaults become more likely, but also they are more likely to occur during disasters, which are times of high marginal utility.
Reinterpretation of …rms as in…nitely lived
I have assumed so far that …rms live only two periods and then exit, but we could allow them to continue operating beyond the second period. In this case, the problem reads
where s t denotes the aggregate states. But it is clear that this problem has the exact same solution as the problem of the two-period …rms. This is because the net present value of operating in the future, W t ; equals zero, since there is constant return to scale, i.i.d. idiosyncratic shocks, and no equity issuance costs. As there are no net future pro…ts to staying in the industry, …rms decide to default based only on the current period pro…t, which implies that the solution is the same as in the two-period case. Obviously, the assumptions that make the two-period and in…nite horizon problem equivalent are somewhat unrealistic, and future work should relax them.
Household
The representative household has preferences over consumption and leisure, following Epstein and Zin (1989):
Here is the inverse of the intertemporal elasticity of substitution (IES) over the consumption-leisure bundle, and measures risk aversion towards static gambles over the bundle. When = , the model collapses to expected utility. While the additional ‡exibility of Epstein-Zin utility is useful in calibrating the model, the key qualitative results can be obtained with standard CRRA preferences (See section 4).
The household supplies labor in a competitive market, and trades stocks and bonds issued by the corporate sector. 11 The budget constraint reads
where B t 1 is the aggregate quantity of debt issued by the corporate sector in period t 1 at price q t 1 , each unit of which is redeemed in period t for % t , n s t is the quantity of equity shares, P t is the price of equity, D t is the payo¤ to equityholders (there is no capital gains term n s t 1 (D t + P t ) since …rms live only two periods), and T t is a lump-sum tax. The number of equity shares n s t is normalized to one. In the absence of default, % t = 1; but % t < 1 if some bonds are not repaid in full. The household takes the process of % t as given, but it is determined in equilibrium by …rms' default decisions as shown in the previous section, so that
Utility maximization yields the familiar labor supply condition:
Intertemporal choices are determined by the stochastic discount factor (a.k.a. marginal rate of substitution), which prices all assets:
U t+1
and the Euler equations
qt is the return on corporate bonds, and R e t+1 =
Dt+1
Pt is the return on equity. 12 
Equilibrium
The equilibrium de…nition is standard: …rst, …rm and household optimization imply (6) and (8) with the stochastic discount factor given by (9) and (12); next the labor market clears:
Last, the goods market clears, i.e. C t + I t = Y t : This last equation re ‡ects an assumption that defaults
are transfers rather than real resources costs. 13 If they are real resource 1 1 It is possible to introduce government bonds as well. If the government …nances this debt using lump-sum taxes and transfers, Ricardian equivalence holds, and government debt policy does not a¤ect the equilibrium allocation and prices. 1 2 Technically, the Euler equations hold for any individual …rm's equity return or bond return. Given that …rms are ex-ante identical, they are written here for the aggregate equity and bond returns (i.e. the return on a diversi…ed portfolio of stocks or bonds). 1 3 For instance, the default costs may be transferred to the government, which then rebates it to household using lump-sum transfers (Tt in equation 10).
costs, default realizations induce a negative wealth e¤ect. The assumption is fairly innocuous because these wealth e¤ects are fairly small, and it helps clarify that it is not default realizations, but ex-ante default risk, that matter for the results.
Overall, equations (6) and (8) are the only departures of our model from the standard real business cycle model: …rst, the Euler equation needs to be adjusted to re ‡ect the tax shield and bankruptcy costs; second, the optimal leverage is determined by the trade-o¤ between costs and bene…ts of debt …nance.
Numerical solution and calibration
This section discusses the solution method and the parameter values.
Recursive representation and solution method
It is useful, both for conceptual clarity and to implement a numerical algorithm, to consider a recursive formulation of the equilibrium. First, note that the equilibrium can be entirely characterized from time t onwards given the values of the realized aggregate capital stock K t ; the probability of disaster p t ; and the level of total factor productivity z t , i.e. these are the three state variables. 14 Second, examination of the …rst-order conditions shows that they can be rewritten solely as a function of the detrended capital k t = K t =z t and p t : This is a standard simpli…cation in the stochastic growth model when technology follows a unit root. As a result the equilibrium policy functions (consumption, investment, employment, leverage and the household value, which matters for the stochastic discount factor) can be expressed as functions of two state variables only, k and p. 
where we denote ! 0 = (x 0 ; e 0 ; b
; and
1 4 Perhaps surprisingly, the level of outstanding debt Bt at the beginning of period is not a state variable. This is because of two assumptions: (1) defaults take place after production, (2) and bankruptcy costs are a tax (i.e. not in the resource constraint). Hence, the outstanding debt, and the number of …rms in default today, does not a¤ect the equilibrium today or in the future.
is the default threshold, and the stochastic discount factor is given by
and utility is de…ned through
A computational advantage of this formulation is that the variables are stationary since we take out the stochastic trend, which of course facilitates the numerical analysis. Compared to the standard RBC model, we have an additional equilibrium policy function to solve for: leverage L(k; p); and correspondingly, we have an additional …rst-order condition.
Given the nonlinear form of the model, and the focus on risk premia, it is important to use a nonlinear solution method. The policy functions are approximated using Chebychev polynomials and solved for using projection methods. 15 
Parametrization
The model is solved and simulated at the annual frequency, using the parameters listed in Table 1 .
(Section 4 and the numerical appendix provide detailed sensitivity analysis.) A …rst set of fairly uncontroversial parameters ( ; ; ; ; ; e ) follows the business cycle literature (see for instance Cooley and Prescott (1995)) . Next, the intertemporal elasticity of substitution of consumption (IES) is set at 2. We discuss below the role of this parameter, and why it is di¢ cult to reconcile the model with the evidence if the IES is low. 16 A critical part of the calibration regards the size and average probability of disasters. Barro and Ursua (2008) and Barro and Jin (2012) , using international data, estimate an average probability of disaster of 3.8% per year, with a mean disaster size of 21% for consumption and a Pareto distribution of disaster size b: However, the United States are probably less likely to be a¤ected by disasters of this size than most other countries. To re ‡ect this, I set conservatively the probability of disaster to 2% per year, and the mean disaster size to 15%. (The Great Depression -the largest disaster experienced by the US - 1 5 The appendix details the computational method, and the Matlab code that implements it is available on the author's webpage. 1 6 Of course, there is a large debate regarding the value of the IES. Most direct estimates using aggregate data …nd low numbers (e.g. Hall (1988) ), but this view has been challenged by several authors (see among others Bansal and Yaron led to a GDP decline of 33%, but it was not permanent.) I also set the standard deviation of log disaster size to 30%, re ‡ecting the large uncertainty about the size of disaster. Another important assumption is that the capital destruction and the TFP reduction are equal, i.e. b k = b z : There is unfortunately little data on TFP and capital stocks (rather than output). Section 4 relaxes and discusses this assumption.
A second critical element is the process for disaster probability, which is a Markov chain, which is picked to approximate the following AR (1):
;where " p;t+1 is i:i:d: N (0; 1): Given the lack of direct evidence on p ; this parameter is chosen so that the model reproduces the volatility of credit spreads. The persistence p of the probability of disaster is set to .75; this parameter is relatively unimportant.
The risk aversion parameter is picked to reproduce approximately the level of equity premia. Note that is the risk aversion over the consumption-hours bundle. Since = 10 and the share of consumption in the utility index is .3, the e¤ective risk aversion to a consumption gamble is 3:33 (Swanson (2012)), a low value by the standards of the asset pricing literature. As I explain below, this risk aversion parameter plays an important role in determining business cycle dynamics.
The last important element of the calibration pertains to the capital structure. I use a log-normal distribution for H, the distribution of idiosyncratic shocks. This leaves me with three parameters: the tax shield ; the bankruptcy cost 1 ; and the standard deviation of idiosyncratic shocks " . There are two reasonable targets for : on the one hand, we know that the recovery rate that lenders get on their defaulted debt is around 45% (the loss given default); on the other hand, estimates of default costs are usually of 10-20% or even less (e.g. see the discussion in Van Binsbergen et al. (2010)). It is impossible to match both targets simultaneously; I compromise and set 1 = :3, which implies an (endogenous) recovery rate on debt " t H(" t ) R " t 0 "dH(") equal to 65%; i.e. the "loss given default" is 35%. 17 The parameters " and are then picked jointly to match the average default rate for BAA …rms in normal times (i.e. outside disasters), 0.5% per year, and average leverage, 0.55 18 . This implies a Because of its stylized nature, my model does not generate a cross-section of …rms: all …rms are ex-ante identical and borrow at the same interest rate. I calibrate the model so that this "representative …rm" has a BAA rating. However, to compare the model implication to the data, I need to de…ne the AAA asset. To do, I introduce a fringe of AAA …rms, which do not a¤ect aggregates, but can be used to calculate the AAA bond price. 19 The question is in what dimension do these …rms di¤er for them to be less risky. Paradoxically, assuming that they have lower idiosyncratic shocks (a lower " ) does not necessarily guarantee that they have lower yields, because they may lever more. Hence, I simply assume that these …rms face lower bene…ts of debt, i.e. have a lower , which leads them to lever less and hence be less risky. I set aaa to replicate the (outside disasters) default rate of AAA which is around 4bps per year (20bps over 5 years); this leads to aaa = 1:63% and a leverage ratio of 45%.
Results
This section …rst explains the response of the model economy to the di¤erent shocks, then discusses the ampli…cation e¤ect of debt …nancing, and the time-varying systematic risk generated by the model, and …nally compares the model implications to the data.
Impulse responses
I …rst discuss the response of the model economy to a standard productivity shock and to a disaster realization. 20 I then turn to the novel shock of this model: variation in disaster probability.
TFP shock
The standard TFP shock has nearly identical e¤ects as in the RBC model: higher TFP leads to higher investment, output, consumption and employment, and to higher equity excess returns (on impact) and interest rates (persistently).Furthermore, the default rate falls on impact, since higher pro…ts increase the likelihood that …rms can repay their debt, but this e¤ect is very small. There is essentially no e¤ect on leverage or credit spreads, because a change in TFP has little e¤ect on the (tax) bene…ts or (default) costs of debt.
…rms face …xed costs, and some production factors are hard to adjust, which imply a higher e¤ective leverage than the …nancial leverage. This motivates my higher target for leverage. 1 9 A previous version of this paper (Gourio (2010) ) de…ned the AAA asset as a risk-free asset, with similar results. 2 0 The …gures corresponding to these impulse response functions are in the online appendix.
Disaster realization
A disaster realization generates an immediate, once-and-for-all decline in productivity, and given the assumption b k = b z ; capital falls by the same amount. As a result, output, investment, consumption all decline once-and-for-all by the same amount endogenously, while employment does not change. The reason is that the decline in productivity leads to a lower optimal stock of capital. But with b k = b z ; the capital stock destruction is exactly in line with the reduced capital demand. Mathematically, the detrended capital stock k = K=z is una¤ected by the disaster realization since the numerator and the denominator are a¤ected in the same way. Economically, the economy shifts from one steady-state of the neoclassical model to another steady-state. Leverage does not change following the disaster since …rms instantaneously rebalance and issue a lower debt, in line with their now lower capital stock.
As for asset prices, the return on physical capital is very low when the disaster hits due to capital destruction. The losses are further increased by default since < 1: The equity return, which is a leveraged version of the return on capital, is hence very low, while the corporate bond return is also low as some …rms go into default and their bonds are not paid back in full. Hence, both equity and corporate debt are risky assets, since their returns are low precisely in the states when consumption is low, i.e. marginal utility is high.
An increase in disaster probability
The important shock in this paper is the shock to the probability of disaster -i.e. an increase in the perceived risk of a very bad outcome. Figure 2 presents the responses of macroeconomic quantities to a one standard-deviation increase in the probability of disaster at time t = 2: The higher risk leads to a sharp reduction in investment. Employment simultaneously falls, generating a recession.
Intuitively, there is less demand for investment and this reduces the need for production. Technically, the employment decline comes from intertemporal substitution of labor supply -the shadow risk-free interest rate is low, leading people to work less.
This low risk-free interest rate re ‡ects a " ‡ight to quality" -the unattractiveness of investment in real capital -and leads consumption to increase on impact. 21 Households would ideally like to save in safe assets. But there is no net supply of safe assets in this economy -only risky capital. 22 Finally, because risk increases, risk premia rise as the economy enters this recession: the expected equity excess return rises with the disaster probability. (2000)). In spite of this deleveraging, the BAA-AAA credit spread increases substantially. Hence, the model will generate the correct negative comovement of investment and credit 2 1 This unattractive on-impact consumption response can be eliminated by introducing sticky prices or countercyclical markups (see Gourio (2012) ). 2 2 As I explain in Section 4, this response requires that (i) there is capital destruction, so that capital is a risky investment;
(ii) the IES of consumption large enough. If these conditions are not both satis…ed, households react to higher disaster risk by increasing investment and reducing consumption. 
Ampli…cation of Business cycles through debt …nance
Importantly, the presence of debt …nancing ampli…es macroeconomic ‡uctuations in the model. To establish this and measure the ampli…cation, …gure 4 superimposes the responses of investment to a shock to the probability of disaster for the all-equity …nanced (RBC) model ( = = 1) and for the benchmark model. Investment is about three times more volatile with debt …nance, which is signi…cant -ampli…cation is usually fairly limited in ‡exible price models. Similar ampli…cation in response to the disaster probability shock holds for other variables such as employment or GDP. On the other hand, there is no ampli…cation for TFP shocks.
To understand this ampli…cation, note that disaster risk has both a direct e¤ect on the risk-adjusted return on capital and an indirect e¤ect. The direct e¤ect is the only one at work in the RBC model ( = = 1). As analyzed in Gourio (2012) , this e¤ect is to make the investment technology less attractive if the IES is larger than unity, and is equivalent to a change in the discount factor of the household.
The indirect e¤ect, which is novel to this paper, is that higher disaster risk increases expected discounted bankruptcy costs: holding debt …xed, default is (i) more likely and (ii) more likely to be systematic, i.e. default is more likely to occur in "bad times". Higher expected bankruptcy costs in turn increase the user cost of capital, leading …rms to cut back more on investment than in the frictionless model. Or to put it another way, these higher bankruptcy costs lead …rms to substitute equity for debt, 
Time-varying systematic risk
To illustrate the increase in systematic risk that occurs when the disaster probability rises, …gure 5 presents the correlation of defaults that is expected given the probability of disaster today, i.e.
Corr t (def i;t+1 ; def j;t+1 ) for any two …rms i and j in the benchmark model. In normal times, the probability of disaster is low, defaults are largely idiosyncratic, since aggregate TFP shocks generate only a limited comovement in defaults. The correlation becomes higher, however, when the probability of disaster rises. This is because defaults are now much more likely to be triggered by the realization of a disaster, which a¤ects all the …rms. This higher implied correlation would show up in some asset prices such as CDOs (collateralized debt obligations). 24 This correlation is driven both by the exogenous increase in aggregate uncertainty, which mechanically increases the correlation (since idiosyncratic uncertainty is constant), but also by …rms'endogenous leverage choices. Because …rms cut back on leverage when disaster risk increases, their choices mitigate the increase in the correlation of defaults. This is illustrated in …gure 5, where the line with crosses is the benchmark model, where …rms choose their leverage each period, and the line with circles is a version of the model with constant leverage. 25 In the latter case, the correlation unambiguously increases, while We now turn to a quantitative examination of the model's implications. Table 2 reports business cycle and asset returns statistics, while table 3 reports leverage, default rates, loss-given-default and credit spreads. The model statistics are calculated in a sample that does not include disaster realizations, to be comparable to the data sample (1947-2011) which is devoid of disasters. 26 To illustrate the role of constant disaster risk and of time-varying disaster risk, the tables present the results for three di¤erent assumptions about the structure of shocks hitting the economy: (i) no disaster risk, i.e. only TFP shocks, (ii) TFP shocks and a positive, but constant probability of disaster;
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(iii) TFP shocks and time-varying disaster risk. I also report results for both the all-equity RBC model ( = = 1) and the benchmark model, with debt …nancing ( < 1 and > 1).
TFP shocks alone (rows 2 and 5) generate a decent match for quantity dynamics, as is well known from the business cycle literature. However quantities are not volatile enough (TFP volatility is too low) and this is especially true for employment. The model also generates small spreads for corporate bonds (22bps, see row 2 of Table 3 ), and these spreads simply account for the average default of corporate bonds: the average return on the BAA and AAA assets are almost equal, i.e. the excess return on benchmark model, except that we discard the …rst-order condition for optimal leverage choice. 2 6 The leverage and default probability data are taken from Chen, Collin-Dufresne, and Goldstein ( Note: Annual volatility of the growth rates of investment, consumption, employment and output; and mean return on the AAA and BAA bonds and equity. Model statistics are computed in a sample without disasters. Note: Mean, volatility and correlation with investment of the credit spread; mean default rate; mean loss given default; mean and volatility of leverage. Annualized statistics. Model statistics are computed in a sample without disasters.
corporate bonds is close to zero. In general, the credit spread between the BAA asset and the AAA asset is the sum of the (physical) compensation for the di¤erent default risks, plus a risk premium:
and here the last term is almost nil : spreads are completely accounted for by the (higher) probability of default of BAA (0:22 = 0:94 0:35 0:32 0:34 + 0:00). Moreover, these spreads are essentially constant. The risk premium for equity is also tiny.
Adding capital structure to the RBC model with only TFP shocks has only minimal e¤ects on quantity dynamics, as can be seen by comparing rows 2 and 5 of Table 2 . Hence, …nancial frictions do not amplify the response to TFP shocks.
When constant disaster risk is added to the model, the quantity dynamics are essentially una¤ected (table 2, comparing rows 2 and 3 or 5 and 6). Table 3 reveals that credit spreads are signi…cantly larger however, because defaults are much more likely during disasters, when marginal utility is high.
The model generates a plausible credit spread of 139bps, much higher than the probability of default (28bps). The equity premium is also high, and it is higher in the model with capital structure, because of leverage. However, the volatility of spreads is still close to zero (and so is leverage). This motivates turning to the model with time-varying risk of disaster.
Rows 4 and 7 display the results for the models with time-varying disaster risk. The variation in disaster risk leads to volatile credit spreads in line with the data. The equity premium is comparable to the data, and similar to that of the model with constant probability of disaster. Introducing the timevarying risk of disaster also generates new quantity dynamics: investment and employment become more volatile, consistent with the impulse response function described in the previous section. Moreover, credit spreads are countercyclical: the model reproduces well the relation between investment or output and credit spreads emphasized in the introduction.
The ampli…cation e¤ect of disaster risk through …nancial frictions is visible in table 2: while the …nancial friction model exhibits less volatility than the RBC model when disaster risk is constant, it has more volatility than the RBC model when disaster risk is added. This is especially true for investment As explained in the introduction, there is substantial evidence that both the level and cyclicality of credit spreads are driven by the risk premium rather than by expected credit losses. Table 4 I close this section by discussing some shortcomings of the model, due to its highly stylized nature.
In particular, the correlation of consumption and output is too low, around 0.2. I abstract from many ingredients such as habits or sticky prices which may help with consumption comovement. Second, there is no default clustering outside disasters, and in particular states with high disaster probability do not generate high default rates. Finally, the equity return is fairly smooth in this model outside disasters.
Equities are a one-period asset here, implying that the conditional volatility of equity returns equals the conditional volatility of dividends (i.e. there is only a cash ‡ow e¤ect and no discount rate e¤ect).
Extensions and Comparative statics
This section considers some implications and extensions of the baseline model, and the sensitivity of the quantitative results to parameter changes.
State-contingent debt
In the aftermath of the 2008 …nancial crisis, several economists have proposed that private sector borrowers issue state-contingent debt with reduced payments conditional on large aggregate shocks (e.g., "contingent convertibles" or CoCos) rather than using standard debt contracts. This section evaluates this proposal by allowing …rms in the model to issue debt contingent on the disaster realization and size (i.e. x and b): The model is easily modi…ed; …rst, the funding constraint now reads,
where B nd t+1 (resp. B 
and similarly for q d t (b 0 ): Note that the default threshold " t+1 depends on the state realized (disaster or not, and of which size), both because the …rm value depends on the state (as in the benchmark model), but also because now the debt due depends on the state. Formally,
where e x t+1 (b 0 ) is an indicator equal to 1 if a disaster of size b 0 is realized, and 0 otherwise. Maximizing equity value yields the …rst-order conditions for optimal debt choices:
Rather than equating expected discounted marginal costs and bene…ts of debt over all the states together, the …rm can now equate these expected marginal costs and bene…ts conditional on a given disaster happening or not. This added ‡exibility will lead the …rm to issue little debt that is payable in disaster states, since bankruptcy is much more likely and costly in these states (through the state prices M t+1 ).
The following proposition demonstrates this for a reasonable special case.
Proposition 1 Assume that p is constant, b k = b z ; and that there are no TFP shocks ( e = 0). If corporations are allowed to issue disaster-contingent debt, they will structure their debt to make the probability of default equal in disaster states and non-disaster states, by issuing proportionately less debt in disasters.
Proof. Given the assumptions, we can simplify the …rst-order conditions (14) (15) : the expectations are just expectations over the idiosyncratic shocks ". Denoting default cuto¤s in non-disaster states by " nd t+1
and in disasters by "
which under the monotonicity assumption (footnote 10) implies that "
is the same. The quantity of debt issued for each state follows from More generally, in this model an ex-post bailout of bondholders that was unexpected would not change the equilibrium, since default realizations do not matter; but a credible policy that …rms in default receive transfers from the government to pay the bondholders in full would reduce credit spreads to zero, and take away the bankruptcy costs. This would lead aggregate investment to become less sensitive to disaster risk, and hence less volatile. Furthermore, investment would be higher since …rms would now use 100% debt …nancing which is cheaper. Obviously, this policy is detrimental to welfare.
The tax advantage of debt and macroeconomic volatility
Following a large literature in corporate …nance, the model features as a prime determinant of capital structure the tax subsidy to debt, or tax shield. The tax shield is ine¢ cient in the model for two reasons:
…rst, the tax shield lowers the user cost of capital and hence encourages capital accumulation. However, the competitive equilibrium of the model without taxes is already Pareto optimal, hence the subsidy leads to overaccumulation of capital. Second, the higher leverage created by the tax shield ampli…es ‡uctuations in aggregate quantities, including consumption, and hence reduces welfare. To illustrate this, the left panel of Figure 6 depicts the mean leverage and the volatility of investment growth in the model, as a function of : For our benchmark calibration, removing the tax shield entirely would increase welfare signi…cantly, equivalent to a permanent increase of consumption of 0.72%. 28 Tables 5 and 6 provide some comparative statics to illustrate the role of various assumptions.
Comparative statics

Sample with disasters
So far the results reported are calculated in samples which do not include disasters. As a result, measured excess returns arise both through a standard risk premium and through sample selection (a 
Fixed leverage
The model assumes that …rms are able to adjust their leverage ratio each period costlessly. In reality, it may be di¢ cult to issue new securities or to repurchase existing securities quickly. Row 4 shows the e¤ect of imposing that …rms keep a constant ratio of debt to capital stock, i.e. L t = B t+1 =K w t+1 = L . This leads to more volatility of both macroeconomic quantities and credit spreads, as …rms cannot delever in response to an increase in disaster risk. The ampli…cation e¤ect becomes larger than in the benchmark model (see …gure 4). The other implications of the model are largely una¤ected. Hence, the key model results are driven by the existence of leverage, and not by the particular adjustment of leverage that is obtained endogenously in the model.
Recursive Preferences: role of IES and risk aversion
Households are assumed to have recursive utility, but the model can also be solved in the special case of expected utility. When the elasticity of substitution is kept equal to 2, and the risk aversion is lowered to :5 to reach expected utility, the qualitative implications are largely una¤ected. Quantitatively however, because risk aversion is lower, all risk premia are lower, and the response of quantities to a probability of disaster shock is also smaller since agents care less about risk. For instance, the volatility of investment falls from 5.28% to 3.04%, the excess return on corporate bonds falls from 78bps to 11bps, and the credit spreads from 90bps to 31bps. This shows that risk aversion is a key determinant of both prices and business cycle quantities in this framework (unlike Tallarini (2000) ).
In contrast, when the elasticity of substitution is reduced to .1 so as to reach the special case of expected utility while keeping = 10, a shock to the probability of disaster leads to starkly di¤erent qualitative e¤ects. Investment, output and employment rise (rather than fall) as the probability of disaster rises. The intuition is that higher risk makes people save more, despite the fact that capital is more risky. In the all-equity model, the threshold value for the IES so that investment increases following a disaster probability shock is unity. In the model of this paper (with debt), higher uncertainty has a more negative e¤ect on investment demand, and hence the threshold value for the IES is lower than unity. Hence, for a range of values of IES below unity, the model with debt …nance implies that higher disaster risk lowers economic activity, while the all-equity model implies the opposite -an extreme example of the potential importance of …nancial frictions.
TFP vs. capital disasters
I model disasters as simultaneous declines in TFP and reduction in the capital stock. If a disaster only a¤ects TFP, there are important qualitative and quantitative changes. First, in response to an increase in disaster probability, investment, output and employment rise, rather than fall -since capital is now a safe asset, it makes sense to engage in precautionary savings in anticipation of disasters. Hence, while investment is very volatile, it has the wrong comovement with credit spreads (and more generally with risk premia). Further, the low risk on capital implies a low equity risk premium and a low corporate bond premium. Hence, overall the model without capital shock is unable to replicate the evidence. (On the other hand, if there are no TFP shocks but only capital shocks, the model generates small risk premia, since agents anticipate a fast return to the steady-state.)
Capital structure parameters
Finally, in this model the level of idiosyncratic risk and bankruptcy costs a¤ect business cycle dynamics by changing the incentives to use leverage. A lower idiosyncratic volatility leads to higher leverage, and hence to a larger sensitivity of macroeconomic quantities to disaster risk.
Higher bankruptcy deadweight cost (reducing ) leads to lower leverage. The e¤ect on spreads is ambiguous: lower recovery rates in themselves work to increase spreads, but lower leverage leads to lower spreads. Macroeconomic quantities are now a tiny bit less sensitive to disaster risk, as default during disasters are less costly. Figure 6 illustrates these comparative statics. Overall, these experi- Note: Volatility of the growth rates of investment, consumption, employment and output; and mean return on the AAA and BAA bonds and equity. Model statistics are computed in a sample without disasters, except where indicated.
ment underscore that leverage is not a su¢ cient statistic for the sensitivity of the economy to shocks:
the underlying cause of high leverage (idiosyncratic volatility, risk aversion, deadweight costs) matters crucially for business cycle analysis.
Comparison with uncertainty shocks
It is interesting to compare the results of the paper with several recent studies that also consider the e¤ect of an increase in risk. Arellano, Bai and Kehoe (2009), Chugh (2009) and Gilchrist, Sim and Zakrajek (2010) all show that a temporary increase in " , the standard deviation of idiosyncratic shocks, leads to a recession by exacerbating …nancial frictions. The increase in disaster probability also leads to an increase in uncertainty and a recession, hence the two mechanisms are broadly similar. 29 A key di¤erence is that an increase in disaster probability increases aggregate uncertainty rather than idiosyncratic uncertainty; as a result there are at least three di¤erent implications: (i) even in the frictionless case ( = = 1), higher aggregate uncertainty creates a recession, whereas higher idiosyncratic risk has no e¤ect; (ii) the response of the economy to a disaster probability shock depends on the risk aversion coe¢ cient, whereas the response to an increase in " does not; (iii) if risk aversion is positive, increasing aggregate risk while keeping total risk constant (by reducing idiosyncratic risk) leads to a recession by increasing the correlation of …rm defaults. Note: Mean, volatility and correlation with investment of the credit spread; mean default rate; mean loss given default; mean and volatility of leverage. Annualized statistics. Model statistics are computed in a sample without disasters, except where indicated.
Conclusion
The key contribution of this paper is to construct a tractable general equilibrium model, consistent with the salient features of credit spreads and economic ‡uctuations. Corporate debt is exposed to tail risk, and the degree of this exposure changes substantially over the business cycle. This allows the paper to link the large macroeconomic literature concerned with …nancial frictions, with the large empirical …nance literature that documents the importance of risk premia in credit markets.
There are two obvious limitations of this model; …rst is that all debt is short-term, which rules out agency issues such as risk-shifting or debt overhang, and may alter some quantitative relationships.
Second, defaults are driven only by insolvency and not by liquidity shortfalls. Integrating these economic features in a quantitative model with sizeable risk-premia seems an important target for future research.
